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El trabajo revisa el modelo de overshooting de Dornbusch; primero, para discutir las 
condiciones de sobrerreacción (overshooting) y subreacción (undershooting) del tipo de 
cambio, extendiendo el modelo para considerar reglas de política monetaria y movilidad 
imperfecta de capitales. En segundo lugar, para realizar una representación del modelo de 
Dornbusch en un modelo dinámico neokeynesiano que puede ser utilizado para analizar el 
impacto persistente de shocks de política monetaria, entre otras perturbaciones. El modelo 
considera el régimen de metas de inflación en un modelo de economía pequeña y abierta 
caracterizada por competencia imperfecta y rigidez de precios en el corto plazo. Los 
principales resultados del trabajo son coherentes con la contribución original de Dornbusch 
en la cual el tipo de cambio sobrerreacciona respecto de su equilibrio de largo plazo. También 
se concluye que los regímenes con tipo de cambio flexible predominan sobre los con tipo de 
cambio manejado o fijo en términos de volatilidad del producto y de la inflación frente a 
shocks reales, mientras que para shocks nominales se revierte la preferencia. 
 
Abstract  
This paper revisits Dornbusch’s overshooting model; first, to discuss the conditions of 
overshooting and undershooting, extending the model to consider monetary policy rules and 
imperfect capital mobility. And second, to outline Dornbusch’s representation in the context 
of a simple dynamic neo-Keynesian model that can be used to analyze the impact of persistent 
changes in monetary policy, among other shocks. The model considers inflation targeting in a 
small open economy setup, which is characterized by imperfect competition and short-run 
price rigidity. The main findings of the paper are consistent with the original contribution 
where the exchange rate overshoots its long run equilibrium. We also show that flexible 
exchange rates dominate managed exchange rates in terms of output and inflation volatility in 





We appreciate useful suggestions from Juan Pablo Medina and Claudio Soto and from 
participants at Lacea, Central Bank of Chile, Universidad de Chile, and ECB-Bank of Mexico 
Workshop. We also thank the editorial assistance of Consuelo Edwards. The usual disclaimer 
applies.  
E-mails: jdegrego@bcentral; eparrado@bcentral.cl. 1 Introduction
About thirty years ago, one of the most|perhaps \the most"| in°uential paper
in international ¯nance, the famous overshooting paper by Rudi Dornbusch (Dorn-
busch, 1976) was published. It is at least the most cited paper in the area and the
most regularly used in courses of international ¯nance (Rogo®, 2002). This paper
introduced rational expectations in models of exchange rate determination, but also
had important implications for asset pricing. It basically showed that exchange rates
could °uctuate more than their fundamentals would warrant, leading to excessive
volatility without the need to assume markets frictions. Indeed, this result is derived
in a model of perfect capital mobility and sticky prices.
The overshooting paper not only was a great piece of research, but also had
important policy implications. In the context of °exible exchange rates, not only
among major currencies, but also increasingly with emerging market currencies, the
excessive volatility is usually mentioned as the main disadvantage of free °oating.
A policy sequel is that overshooting is often used to justify intervening in foreign
exchange markets. This is also a strong reason why policymakers su®er from \fear
of °oating" (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).
From the empirical point of view, the evidence has been mixed and there are
several dimensions in which the model performs poorly.1 Starting from the \ex-
change rate disconnect puzzle" from Meese and Rogo® (1983), which shows that no
structural model can predict exchange rates, not even monetary ones, there have
been many attempts to explain exchange rate °uctuations. One important result
from VARs has been that after a contractionary monetary policy shock the exchange
rate appreciates, but the peak is reached several quarters after the contraction (see,
e.g., Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995). This \delayed overshooting" contrasts with
the sharp instant overshooting predicted by Dornbusch (1976). Faust and Rogers
(2003) and, more recently, Bj¿rnland (2006) propose new identi¯cation restrictions
that reduce this delayed overshooting. Although we do not to intend to address
empirically the overshooting hypothesis, it is useful to review analytically the ro-
bustness of overshooting and which type of conditions are required to generate a
di®erent behavior of exchange rates.
In this paper we address two issues that are important from the standpoint
of both the analytical and the empirical relevance of overshooting. The ¯rst is
to examine the conditions under which the exchange rate undershoots instead of
overshoots as in the original model. This could help to reconcile the evidence with
Dornbush's model (Rogo®, 2002). However, in the basic theoretical framework, the
conditions to generate undershooting are rather contrived, namely, that the interest
rate rises as a result of a monetary expansion. Therefore, under perfect capital
mobility, with the consequent uncovered interest rate parity, overshooting should
1For a recent discussion in the context of overshooting, see Rogo® (2002) and Bj¿rnland (2006).
1be a natural outcome. We also show, that dropping perfect capital mobility as
suggested by Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982) also requires special conditions. In such
case it would be necessary for the current account de¯cit to narrow after a monetary
expansion.
The second issue we examine here is the response of the exchange rate to di®erent
kinds of shocks in the context of a new Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium
model, which are becoming standard in applied monetary policy. This helps to
understand whether the main results still hold in a general equilibrium model with
microeconomic foundations. Indeed, according to Obstfeld and Rogo® (1996): On
the theoretical plane, the Dornbusch overshooting model has several methodological
drawbacks. The most fundamental is the model's lack of explicit choice-theoretic
foundations. In particular there are no microfoundations of aggregate supply. This
paper contributes to ¯lling this gap. We show that the overshooting is robust to this
more general and rigorous formulation. In addition, from an empirical standpoint, it
is necessary to recognize that the movements in monetary policy and exchange rates
depend on the nature of the shocks. And one criticism with traditional identi¯cation
restrictions in VARs is that they ignore the contemporaneous correlation between
exchange rates and monetary policy. The reaction of monetary policy will depend
on the characteristics of the policy rule and the shocks that trigger that reaction.
Indeed, in this framework, a pure permanent monetary shock as the one envisioned
in Dornbusch's model, has to be interpreted as a change in the in°ation or price
level target.
It is important to note that the purpose of this paper is not to build a model that
can explain the many empirical failures and puzzles of exchange rates, but to revisit
the basic framework to argue that it is still a mechanism that should be present in
most models of monetary policy and exchange rates. However, we also show that
these models, even with overshooting, are unable to explain why exchange rates
are so much more volatile than prices. In addition, the general equilibrium model
we present in this paper can be used to analyze di®erent policy rules depending
on the degree of exchange rate management. We show that °exible exchange rates
dominate managed exchange rates in terms of output and in°ation volatility in
the presence of real shocks, while the reverse is true for nominal shocks, which is
consistent with the results from Mundell (1963).
In the next section we describe the basic logic of overshooting. Then, in section 3
we present a simpli¯ed version of the original model. Section 4 presents a dynamic
general equilibrium model with sticky prices, which is then simulated in section
5. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of issues for further research which are
particularly relevant in the context of policymaking.
22 The Basis of Overshooting
The logic for overshooting can be understood just by looking at the interest rate
parity condition:
it = i¤
t + Etst+1 ¡ st: (1)
Notation is the traditional one, and s represents the log of the nominal exchange rate,
measured as the domestic price of foreign currency.2 The term Etst+1 ¡ st stands
for the expected rate of depreciation. Let's consider a su±ciently long period, so
that Etst+1 is the long-run equilibrium nominal exchange rate, denoted by ¹ s.
Consider now a permanent monetary expansion, where M increases by µ percent,
this is, Mt+1 = Mt(1 + µ). In any model where money is neutral, the equilibrium
exchange rate will rise also by µ percent. Therefore, ¹ st+1 = (1 + µ)¹ st.
Now, a monetary expansion will cause a reduction in the interest rate, and hence,
there should be an expected appreciation of the domestic currency to compensate
for the lower return in domestic currency. But, how can a currency that depreciates
in the long-run incur in an appreciation during the transition to the equilibrium?
The only possibility is that on impact the exchange rate depreciates, but beyond its
long-run equilibrium, so on the path to the equilibrium it appreciates. Hence, the
exchange rate overshoots its long-run equilibrium (see Figure 1).
Note that the exchange rate does not adjust immediately to its long-run equilib-
rium, and this behavior is key for the slow adjustment in prices: otherwise money
would be neutral even in the short run, because the exchange rate would adjust to
its equilibrium immediately. The rigidity of prices is what generates changes in the
interest rate to sustain the equilibrium in the money market.
As long as the interest rate declines and the long-run exchange rate increases,
as do its expectations, the only option is an overshooting. In this way, there is an
appreciation on the equilibrium path.
Empirically, the \overshooting" model has not been very successful. It predicts
that low interest rates should be correlated with a depreciated exchange rate, some-
thing that could be the case under large monetary expansions and regime changes,
but that does not happen in normal circumstances. As has been argued by Rogo®
(2002) and Obstfeld and Rogo® (1996), a possible explanation is that rather than
having overshooting there is undershooting, that is, the exchange rate does not move
beyond its long-run equilibrium.
To understand undershooting we can just look again at equation (1). There will
be undershooting, under perfect capital mobility, if the interest rate goes up instead
2It goes up when it depreciates.
3of down after a monetary expansion. Then, the exchange rate will depreciate, but
on the path to the equilibrium it will have to depreciate to o®set the higher interest
rate (i > i¤). According to equation (1), if the interest rate increases, there is
a need for an expected depreciation on the path toward a depreciated exchange
rate. Therefore, the initial jump in the exchange rate falls short of the equilibrium




i < i¤ - overshooting
i > i¤ - undershooting
s1
Figure 1: Monetary Expansion and Exchange Rate Adjustment
How can an undershooting happen? In the original model, a monetary expansion
causes both a depreciation and an expansion of output. If the expansion of output
is large enough, this may increase money demand to a point where it rises more
than money supply, requiring a rise in the interest rate to equilibrate the money
market. In terms of the model, the requirement is for output to react strongly to
the depreciation and the money demand, in turn, reacts strongly to output. In this
case, the rise in the interest rate on investment does not o®set the depreciation from
the point of view of aggregate demand.3 We formalize this point in the next section.
Therefore, the undershooting requires a rise in the interest rate as result of a
monetary expansion. This is unrealistic, and does not seem a good starting point
to explain the potential empirical weaknesses of overshooting.
Other form of obtaining undershooting, that we formalize in the next section,
is to drop the assumption of perfect capital mobility. If we add a risk premium to
equation (1), a monetary expansion that reduces interest rates still can be consistent
with an expected depreciation if the risk premium falls more than the interest rate.
However, this is also a condition di±cult to hold in reality.
3This cannot happen in a closed economy, since the interest rate is the only connection between
the money market and the aggregate demand.
43 Overshooting Vintage 1976
The description of overshooting has needed no additional structure beyond the un-
covered interest rate parity. In order to grasp more intuition on the result, here
we present a simpli¯ed version of the model, and then some extensions. In this
section we focus on the conditions that generate overshooting and undershooting.
The latter could help to reconcile the empirical evidence of the correlation between
interest rates and exchange rates. However, it is important to add the caveat that
we still need to explain excessive volatility of the exchange rate with respect to that
of prices, in which case overshooting still helps.
3.1 The original version
In continuous time and under perfect foresight, the uncovered interest rate parity
becomes:
i = i¤ + _ s; (2)
where _ x represents the derivative of x with respect to time. Since s is the log of the
exchange rate, _ s is its rate of change.
Output is determined by the aggregate demand (IS) and in°ation is given by a
Phillips curve where an increase in the output gap reduces in°ation. All parameters
in what follows are positive. The equations for the IS and the Phillips curve are:
y = ¹ y + Á(s ¡ p); (3)
_ p = ¸(y ¡ ¹ y); (4)
respectively. Note that the IS depends only on the real exchange rate, where p
is the log of the price level, and the log of foreign prices is normalized to 1. We
have excluded, without loss of generality, the e®ects of interest rates on aggregate
demand. The natural level of output is ¹ y.
Finally, the money market equilibrium is given by:
m ¡ p = ¡´i + ·y: (5)
Substituting the aggregate demand in the Phillips curve we have the following law
of motion for prices:
_ p = Á¸(s ¡ p): (6)
In turn, solving for the interest rate using the money market equilibrium and the un-
covered interest rate parity, and then replacing y by the aggregate demand function,














Now we can draw the phase diagram for the system using equations (6) and (7).
The equation for _ p = 0 is a 45-degree line. Under the assumption that ·Á < 1,
the line for _ s = 0 is negatively sloped as in Figure 2. When ·Á > 1 the _ s = 0 is
positively sloped, and the slope is less than 1 as in Figure 3. In both cases, the
system is saddle-path stable, and the saddle path corresponds to SS.
We examine the e®ects of a permanent monetary expansion. It is easy to check
that money is neutral in the long-run, and in equilibrium, both p and s increase in the
same proportion as the monetary expansion. When ·Á < 1, the monetary expansion
causes on impact a jump in the exchange rate above its long-run equilibrium, so there
is overshooting. The depreciation induces an output expansion that does not o®set
the increase in money, so the interest rate declines, and the exchange rate must
appreciate on the path to the steady state. The economy jumps from E to B and
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Undershooting occurs when ·Á > 1. In this case, the initial depreciation causes
an output expansion that raises money demand by more than the increase in supply,
and hence the interest rate goes up. Consequently, the exchange rate depreciates
on the path to the equilibrium. For this result to happen, the combination of the
reaction of output to the exchange rate, given by Á, and the reaction of the money
demand to output, given by ·, needs to be strong enough to induce a rise in the
interest rate as a result of the monetary expansion. The exchange rate jumps to B,
but then gradually depreciates along the upward sloping saddle path to reach E0.
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As argued before, it is di±cult to think realistically that monetary expansions
cause an increase in interest rates. Therefore, it does not look as a promising avenue
to explain the lack of support that overshooting has on the data.
3.2 Monetary policy rules
A more promising area may be to model policymaking in a more realistic framework.
A permanent increase in money supply, for no reason, is not what we often observe in
reality. Since Taylor (1993), we are more used to think that monetary policy reacts
to news in the economy with the purpose of ful¯lling some objective. In general,
central banks' objective is price stability. We can accommodate other objectives,
but what we mean to emphasize is that money supply is changed as a response
to some shock in order to meet some objective regarding output °uctuations and
in°ation.
We can rewrite Dornbusch's model assuming a monetary policy rule. In this case
money is endogenous, and the interest rate adjusts to meet price stability. For this
purpose we can replace the money demand equation by the following Taylor-type
rule:
i = i¤ + a(p ¡ ¹ p) + b(y ¡ ¹ y): (8)
The only variation from the traditional Taylor rule is that the objective of the
monetary authority is assumed to be the price level rather than in°ation. The reason
is that in the context of this model, assuming an in°ationary objective leads to the
7well-known problem of indeterminacy. The price level would be indeterminate. It
is easy to show that the _ s = 0 schedule is the same as the _ p = 0 schedule, and any
point in which s = p would be an equilibrium. However, using the rule given by (8)











Therefore, we reproduce the same diagrams as in the original Dornbusch's model,
and when a
bÁ > 1 there is overshooting, while when a
bÁ < 1 there is undershooting.
Instead of thinking of a permanent monetary expansion we can now interpret it as
an increase in the price level target. However, this extension does not solve the basic
problem with undershooting: in order to generate undershooting, the interest rate
must rise when the price level target increases. The increase in the target leads to
a decline in the interest rate, but there is also an output expansion that tends to
result in a rise in interest rate. Therefore, whenever bÁ is large with respect to a
the output e®ect of the monetary expansion dominates the rising of the price level
target, leading to a rise in the interest rate.
3.3 Imperfect capital mobility
Until now, we have assumed that capital is perfectly mobile. Frenkel and Rodriguez
(1982) argue that the limits to capital mobility may explain why exchange rates
adjust more slowly than prices and output. We can assume that countries face an
upward-sloping supply of foreign ¯nancing. There is a risk premium that depends
on the amount of borrowing, in this case on the negative value of net exports, which
in our notation are represented by Á(s¡p). Hence, we can write uncovered interest
parity as:
i = i¤ + _ s ¡ ¯Á(s ¡ p); (10)
where ¯ denotes the extent of capital market imperfections. The risk premium is
increasing with the current account de¯cit.4 If ¯ is zero, we are back to full capital
mobility. As ¯ increases the balance in the current account becomes more important
as a determinant of the exchange rate vis-µ a-vis the parity condition.
This representation is the same as the traditional way models of the 1980s used
for imperfect capital mobility. For example, Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982) assume
that under imperfect capital mobility the exchange rate is determined by the equi-
librium in the balance of payments, where the capital account was an increasing
function of the interest rate di®erential (in domestic currency), which can be writ-
ten, in our formulation, as ¡Á(s¡p) = °(i¡i¤ ¡ _ s). This is the same as our parity
condition just by recognizing that ° ´ 1=¯.
4It is trivial to generalize the condition to allow for minimum risk premium to insure higher
domestic interest rates.
8Using equation (10) to obtain _ s as a function of s and p, we have the following








m + i¤´ ¡ ·¹ y
´
: (11)
When ¯ = 0 we have the result of perfect capital mobility, in which overshooting
occurs whenever Á· < 1. However, under imperfect capital mobility it is possible to
have both a decline in the interest rate and undershooting as a result of a monetary
expansion. In the limit, when ¯ ! 1, the coe±cient of p is positive and equal
to 1, in which case there is indeterminacy. Indeed, for all ¯ > (1 ¡ ·Á)=´Á, the
slope of _ s = 0 is positive and there is undershooting. Assume the extreme case
where the money demand does not depend on income (· = 0). This is su±cient
for overshooting under perfect capital mobility, since there will be a decline in the
interest rate after a monetary expansion. Under imperfect capital mobility, however,
we can still have undershooting and a decline in the interest rate. For this we need
a large value of ¯. The monetary expansion will cause a decline in the interest rate
and a depreciation of the currency, which will go on depreciating towards the new
steady state.
The mechanics of undershooting can be understood by examining (10). The
decline in the interest rate may be consistent with an expected depreciation if the
risk premium drops more than the decline in the interest rate. This means that the
decline in i must be less than the decline in the risk premium, and hence _ s should be
positive when there is a monetary expansion, despite the fall in i. The latter e®ect is
due to the initial depreciation that generates an improvement in the current account
that reduces the risk premium. From a practical point of view it seems unrealistic
that a monetary expansion would cause a decline in the risk premium large enough
to o®set the arbitrage e®ects of a reduction in the domestic interest rate.
Although the results of Dornbusch's model |extended to include imperfect cap-
ital mobility| are appealing, they still have some uncomfortable features. First,
the monetary expansion causes the current account balance to improve, something
not fully convincing. In principle, the decline in the interest rate should spur ex-
penditure and, excluding the switching e®ects of the exchange rate, deteriorate the
current account. Second, at a more formal level, the modelling of the risk premium
is still a shortcut. The risk premium should depend rather on the stock than on the
°ows of foreign liabilities. Moreover, perhaps government liabilities are the most
relevant factors in°uencing risk premia.
From the exercises analyzed in this section we can conclude that adding a mone-
tary policy rule does not generate plausible undershooting. Although undershooting
can still happen with imperfect capital mobility, its implications regarding the risk
premium and the current account are rather counterintuitive. But, as argued before,
monetary policy responds to many di®erent shocks, rather than simply permanent
9monetary expansions, and its evolution will depend on the nature of the shock. The
purpose of the next section is to analyze the evolution of the exchange rate in a
general equilibrium model with sticky prices.
4 Exchange Rates in a Dynamic New-Keynesian (DNK)
General Equilibrium Model
In this section we present the DNK model |modi¯ed to allow for in°ation targeting|
that will be used to describe the simulation exercises.5 The model consists of an
open economy in which there is a central bank, a ¯scal authority (the government),
a representative consumer, and monopolistically competitive ¯rms. All goods are
tradable. As is standard in this literature, domestic production requires a contin-
uum of di®erentiated labor inputs that are supplied by home individuals. Time is
discrete.
Having described the general setup of the model, we proceed in three steps.
First, we outline the main building blocks of the model and its micro-foundations.
Second, we derive the main price relationships of the model (in°ation rates and
exchange rates). Finally, we embed these relationships in an otherwise conventional
DNK model.6
4.1 Micro-foundations of Demand and Supply
4.1.1 Preferences
The economy has a continuum of measure 1 of consumers-producers indexed by















where 0 < ¯ < 1 is the discount factor. M and Y are money balances and production















5This framework builds on previous research by Svensson (1999, 2000) and Gal¶ ³ and Monacelli
(2002), all of which focus on the performance of simple policy rules (whether optimal or not) in
open economies. See Lane (2001) for a survey on the new open macroeconomics literature that
incorporate imperfect competition and nominal rigidities.
6See Goodfriend and King (1997) and Clarida, Gal¶ ³, and Gertler (1999) for a description of the
DNK approach.
10where ´ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods,
and ° is the share of domestic consumption allocated to imported goods. The two
consumption subindexes, CH;t and CF;t, are symmetric and are de¯ned, as in Dixit


















where µ > 1 will turn out to be the price elasticity of demand faced by each monop-
olist, CH;t(j) and CF;t(j) are the quantities purchased by home agents of home and
foreign goods, respectively.
Each agent produces one di®erentiated good, and the disutility from production
is given by À.
Consumers can store domestic non-interest bearing money and, as in Cole and
Obstfeld (1991) and Gal¶ ³ and Monacelli (2002), these consumers can also hold state-
contingent claims. The latter means that ex-ante there are complete international
¯nancial markets, and thus, there is no need for international portfolio diversi¯ca-
tion. In equilibrium, it will also mean that transitory shocks do not have permanent
consequences, thereby sharply simplifying our analysis. The individual household
constraint is given by
Z 1
0
[PH;t(j)CH;t(j) + PF;tCF;t(j)]dj + Mt(j) + Et [Ft;t+1Bt+1(j)] (15)
= (1 ¡ ¿)PH;t(j)YH;t(j) + Mt¡1(j) + Bt(j) + TRt;
where Ft;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor, Bt+1 is the payo® in period t + 1 of
the portfolio held at the end of period t, TRt are lump sum transfers, and ¿ is a
proportional tax on nominal income.




















1¡µ are the price
indexes for domestic and foreign goods, both expressed in the domestic currency.
Using the de¯nition of total consumption (13), we can derive the demand allo-
cation for home and foreign goods














1¡´ + ° (PF;t)
1¡´
i 1
1¡´ is the consumer price index (CPI).
Substituting equation (16) into the budget constraint (15), we can obtain a new
expression for the latter in terms of the composite good:
PtCt + Mt(j) + Et [Ft;t+1Bt+1(j)] (17)
= (1 ¡ ¿)PH;t(j)YH;t(j) + Mt¡1(j) + Bt(j) + TRt:
The home agent's problem is to choose paths for consumption, money, and out-
put of good j. Therefore, the representative consumer chooses her optimal holdings
of contingent bonds, B(j), and her money holdings, M(j), to maximize her ex-
pected utility (12) subject to the budget constraint (17). It follows that the ¯rst























Equation (18) represents the traditional intertemporal Euler equation for total real
consumption, while equation (19) corresponds to the intertemporal Euler equation
for money.
The problem is analogous for the rest of the world. However, the crucial as-
sumption here is that the share of goods that are not produced within the economy















= Et [Ft;t+1];: (20)
Where S is the nominal exchange rate. Combining and iterating equations (18) and







Pt is the real exchange rate and · is a constant that depends on initial
wealth di®erences. Thus, the complete markets assumption brings equation (21),
which associates home consumption to the rest of the world's consumption and a
switching factor given by the real exchange rate.7
7The complete markets assumption has the additional advantage of eliminating foreign asset
accumulation or decumulation from the dynamics of the economy. As a result, the steady state is
unique, in that consumption is independent of the past history of shocks. We can thus linearize
124.1.2 Technology and Price Setting
The model employs a price-setting process that follows Calvo (1983), in which ¯rms
are able to change their prices only with some probability, independently of other
¯rms and the time elapsed since the last adjustment. We assume that producers










H;t = CH;t + C¤
H;t.
Recall that the economy has a continuum of measure 1 of consumers-producers
indexed by j 2 [0;1], where each consumer-producer has the same expected pro¯t
































where ® is the probability that consumers-producers maintain the same price of
the previous period, ¤ is the marginal utility of home goods,
V[yd
H;t(j)]
Zt is the input
requirement function, Z is an exogenous economy-wide productivity parameter, and
hence À ´ V=Z, and W is the price of the composite input.
The problem of the producers, to be solved in the Appendix, is to choose pt(j)
to maximize equation (23) subject to (22).
4.2 Government
We assume that the government balances its budget each period. Thus, the govern-
ment budget constraint is given by
¿PH;tYH;t ¡ TRt + Mt ¡ Mt¡1 = 0:
We restrict our analysis to the case in which ¿ = 1
1¡µ. Here, the government o®-
sets the market power distortion created by monopolistic competition in the market
around that unique steady state. This is not possible in standard models of small open economies.
However, the caveat of this assumption is that it prevents current account °uctuations. The mech-
anism of adjustment to shocks depends exclusively on real exchange rate °uctuations, without
changes in net-asset positions. See, the seminal paper by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001).
13for di®erentiated goods. This means that the only distortion in the economy will
be price rigidity, and o®setting the e®ects of that distortion will be the objective of
monetary policy.
4.3 Price Relationships
Before moving to the complete log-linearized model, we de¯ne the price relationships
(in log terms) involved in the model.
Let pH;t and pF;t be the stochastic components of (log) levels of domestic and
foreign good prices in period t, respectively. Thus, the (log) Consumer Price Index
(CPI) can be de¯ned as
pt = (1 ¡ °)pH;t + °pF;t; (24)
where °, a parameter of the utility function, is the share of foreign goods in the
CPI. Therefore, the (log) CPI in°ation can also be de¯ned as
¼t = (1 ¡ °)¼H;t + °¼F;t; (25)
where ¼H;t = pH;t ¡ pH;t¡1 is domestic in°ation and ¼F;t = pF;t ¡ pF;t¡1 denotes
foreign in°ation. It is worth noting that, depending on the choice of the in°ation
target (CPI or domestic in°ation), ¼t and ¼H;t will be measured as deviations from
a constant mean, which equals the constant in°ation target.
Similarly, the (log) real exchange rate can be de¯ned as
qt ´ st + p¤
t ¡ pt ) qt = (1 ¡ °)(st + p¤
t ¡ pH;t); (26)
where we have included the key assumption that the rest of the world behaves
as a closed economy, i.e. p¤
t = p¤
F;t. In other words, we are assuming that the
consumption of foreign goods by foreigners (that is, of the goods produced by the
home economy) is negligible for the rest of the world.8
4.4 The Log-Linearized Model
This section presents the complete log-linearized model of this open economy. Ad-
ditional details are deferred to the Appendix.
Let lower-case variables denote percent deviations from the steady state, and let
ratios of capital letters without a time subscript denote steady-state values of the
respective ratios. It is then convenient to express the complete log-linearized model
8Monacelli (2004) uses the same approximation.
14in terms of three blocks of equations: (1) Aggregate Demand, (2) Aggregate Supply,
and (3) Monetary Policy Rule and Stochastic Processes.
4.4.1 Aggregate Demand
Aggregate demand in this economy is given by9
xt = Et[xt+1] ¡
1
¾























, and 0 · ½z · 1.
Note that it = 1
Et[Ft;t+1] is the gross return on a riskless one-period discount bond
paying o® one unit of domestic currency in t + 1. The disturbance zt is the natural
level of output that is driven by shocks arising from technologies. Hence, it is
interpreted as a productivity shock.
Equation (27) represents a non-traditional IS curve that relates output gap not
only to the interest rate, but to expected future output gap and to current and
expected future nominal exchange rates as well. A nominal depreciation, and con-
sequently a real depreciation, raises aggregate demand, because it shifts demand
from foreign goods to domestic output (foreign prices are given, and any repercus-
sion e®ects from the home economy to the rest of the world are neglected). It is
worth mentioning that the nominal exchange rate appears on the IS curve because
we express the aggregate demand in terms of domestic in°ation rather than CPI
in°ation. This is useful not only to decompose overall in°ation into the domestic
and foreign components but also to model exchange rate °exibility in the monetary
policy rule.
4.4.2 Aggregate Supply
Aggregate supply is obtained by log-linearizing the ¯rst order condition of the price
setting problem.10 It follows that
¼H;t = ¯Et[¼H;t+1] + ¸xxt + ¸qqt (28)
or ¼H;t = ¯Et[¼H;t+1] + ¸xxt + ¸q(st + p¤




15¼t = (1 ¡ °)¼H;t + °(st ¡ st¡1); (30)
where ¸x =
(1¡®)(1¡®¯)
®(1+»µ) », ¸q = ¸x
±
1¡°, » > 0 is the elasticity of V 0 with respect to
Y d
t , ut is a cost push shock, and ± is the share of tradable goods in the composite
input. The latter implies that the exchange rate component will not enter the
aggregate supply function if the composite input is only domestic.
Equation (28) embeds the staggered price setting formulation of Calvo (1983)
described earlier, giving rise to the dynamic version of the aggregate supply schedule
for domestic goods. Current domestic in°ation depends on expected future domestic
in°ation, current domestic output, and the real exchange rate. The real exchange
rate enters the price equation because there are imported inputs, whose importance
is measured by ±. This re°ects the forward-looking nature of the price setting, due
to the implicit costs of changing prices.
Equation (30) de¯nes CPI in°ation in terms of domestic in°ation and accu-
mulated nominal exchange rate depreciation. Derivation of this equation assumes
foreign prices to be constant.
4.4.3 Uncovered Interest Parity Condition
Uncovered interest parity condition (UIP) is given by
it = i¤
t + Et[st+1] ¡ st; (31)
which relates the movements of the interest rate di®erentials to the expected varia-
tions in the nominal exchange rate.
4.4.4 Monetary Policy Rules and Stochastic Processes
We assume that the Central Bank manages a short term nominal interest rate ac-
cording to an open economy variant of the Taylor rule.11 Speci¯cally, we consider a
rule in which the central bank adjusts the current nominal interest rate in response
to expected in°ation, the current output gap, the current exchange rate, and the
lagged interest rate. In general, this kind of rule provides a fairly good description
of the variation of short term interest rates.12
As shown by Clarida, Gal¶ ³, and Gertler (1998), the current interest rate typically
depends on the interest rate target and the lagged interest rate, i.e., there is a
11The model focuses on interest rate policies, while most other papers try to characterize the
optimal behavior of the nominal quantity of money, starting with the seminal paper by Obstfeld
and Rogo® (1995).
12See Clarida, Gal¶ ³, and Gertler (1998, 2000) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
16degree of interest rate smoothing given by ½i. The assumption behind this point
is that monetary authorities are concerned about interest rate volatility, because it
is presumably costly in terms of ¯nancial market health and also investment and
growth. Thus we have,
it = (1 ¡ ½i)¹ {t + ½iit¡1; (32)
where ¹ {t is the nominal interest target toward which the central bank gradually
adjusts the interest rate, given by
¹ {t = Â¼Et[¼t+k ¡ ¹ ¼] + Âxxt + Âsst; (33)
where Â¼ > 1, Âx ¸ 0, Âs ¸ 0, and ¹ ¼ is the in°ation target. It is important to note
that the policy rule used by the monetary authority depends on expected future
in°ation. Higher expected future in°ation raises the current nominal interest rate
target. Batini and Haldane (1999) also consider this kind of policy rule. They
conclude that in°ation forecast-based policy rules embody all information useful for
predicting future in°ation, and can achieve a high degree of output smoothing.
Including the term Âs in the policy rule helps to reproduce the behavior of
nominal exchange rates. Depending on the degree of control that the central bank
exercises over the nominal exchange rate { the value of Âs { this rule will imply the
type of exchange regime chosen by the country. If Âs ¼ 0, the central bank does not
care about deviations of the nominal exchange rate, i.e., the economy reproduces a
°exible exchange rate behavior. On the other hand, if Âs 2 (0;1), the central bank
acts in response to the deviation of the nominal exchange rate from its current target
or steady-state value. This case would correspond to a managed exchange rate and,
in the limit as Âs goes to in¯nity, to a ¯xed exchange rate. Note that exchange
rate, in the context of perfect capital mobility, must be managed via changes in the
interest rate, and there is no scope for sterilized intervention.
Plugging equation (33) into equation (32), we have that the monetary policy
rule is given by13
it = ½iit¡1 + v¼Et[¼t+k ¡ ¹ ¼] + vxxt + vsst; (34)
13An important consideration is in order about the de¯nition of in°ation targeting. Some authors
argue, based on McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Batini and Haldane (1999), that in°ation target-
ing is the case in which monetary policy responds to in°ation in addition to other variables such as
output and real exchange rates. Alternatively, Svensson de¯nes targeting one or several variables
means minimizing a loss function that is increasing in the deviation between the target variable(s)
and the target level(s). He points out that \the best way to minimize such a loss function is then
to respond optimally with the instrument to the determinants of the target variables, that is, the
state variables of the economy."
Note that these two de¯nitions are equivalent only if there is a one-to-one relation between the
variables in the reaction function and the loss function.
17where v¼ = (1 ¡ ½i)Â¼, vx = (1 ¡ ½i)Âx, and vs = (1 ¡ ½i)Âs.
Finally, equations (35), (36), (37), and (38) describe the evolution of the in°ation
target, the foreign interest rate, the foreign output, technology, and cost push shocks,
respectively.






zt = ½zzt¡1 + "z
t; (37)






t are i.i.d. shocks distributed with zero mean.
5 Simulation Exercises
This section describes the results of some quantitative experiments indicating how
di®erent shocks can in°uence exchange rate dynamics within the DNK framework.
Speci¯cally, the analysis considers four types of shocks: in°ation target, foreign
interest rate, technology, and cost push shocks.
5.1 Model Parameterization
For the parameters, standard values that appear in the traditional related literature
are chosen.
The following parameter values are selected both from traditional related litera-
ture and from current Chilean data. The quarterly discount factor is set at ¯ = 0:99.
The share of domestic goods in total home consumption is assumed to be ° = 0:7.
The probability that a ¯rm does not change its price within a given period, ®, is
set equal 0:75, which implies that the frequency of price adjustment is four quar-
ters. The price demand elasticity or the degree of monopolistic competition, µ, is
set at 4:33. It is assumed that ¾ = 1, which corresponds to log utility, and it is also
assumed that the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, ´,
equals 1:5.
The baseline policy rule |equation (34)| is a Taylor rule where the degree of
interest rate smoothing, ½i, is equal to 0:7 and the coe±cient associates to in°ation
and output are Â¼ = 1:5 and Ây = 0:5, respectively. For the exchange rate we
consider two cases. For °exible exchange rate we set Âs ¼ 0 and for managed
exchange rate we use Âs = 2:2. Finally, the serial correlation parameters for the
shocks are set equal to 0:8.
185.2 Results and Comparisons
Four types of aggregate shocks are considered: in°ation target, foreign interest rate,
technology, and cost push shocks. Each shock is a ¯rst-order process, as described
above. Since all shocks are assumed to be AR(1), they are transitory with a persitent
paramenter of 0:8. As stressed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), one has to
present unconditional standard deviations to obtain a policy evaluation criterion
that is not subject to any problem of time consistency. In other words, the analysis
does not impose any condition on the current state of the economy at the particular
date at which the policy action is to be taken. Selected unconditional standard
deviations for each shock are reported in tables 1 and 2 for all exercises, which are
discussed after presenting the simulations.
A Dornbusch exercise under a DNK model To demonstrate the dynamic
properties of the model, the example of an in°ation target shock that hits the econ-
omy is considered (see Figure 4). This shock could be interpreted as a persistent
monetary expansion as in the original Dornbusch exercise. The results are con-
sistent with the original exercise where the exchange rate overshoots its long-run
equilibrium. In particular, an in°ation target innovation causes a reduction in the
interest rate and, hence, there should be an expected appreciation of the exchange
rate to compensate for the lower return on domestic currency. As in the original
case, the only possibility to combine a long-term depreciation with an expected ap-
preciation is to have, on impact, a nominal depreciation larger than the long-run
equilibrium. And this is the case in our example, given the uncovered interest parity
condition and the exogeneity of the foreign interest rate. The nominal exchange rate
depreciates on impact, and then stays persistently above the original steady state.
Nominal rigidities further cause a signi¯cant drop in the real interest rate and a real
exchange rate depreciation, which, in turn, induces an expansion of output and a
rise on impact of CPI in°ation.
Recall that under a foreign exchange intervention, the monetary authority gives
some weight to exchange rate stabilization in its policy rule. Since an in°ation tar-
geting regime does not allow for a pure ¯xed exchange rate, the policy instrument
is still the nominal interest rate. Thus, if the central bank exercises some control
over the nominal exchange rate, the impact of an in°ation target shock (and, con-
sequently, its volatility) is more limited than in the case without foreign exchange
intervention. Thus, the reaction of the nominal interest is also more limited if the
nominal exchange rate is managed, because the overshooting feature is not present.
Hence, the fall in the interest rate is not compensated by °uctuations in the exchange
rate.
Foreign interest rate shock Under °exible exchange rates, the domestic nom-
inal interest rate is not tied to the foreign interest rate. Consequently, a foreign
19interest rate shock (see Figure 5) produces a considerable nominal depreciation,
which has a signi¯cant impact on CPI in°ation. As with the in°ation target shock,
the foreign interest rate shock results in an exchange rate that stays persistently
above the initial steady state. Given that prices are sticky, the real exchange rate
depreciates and, hence, has a marginal positive impact on the output gap.
On the other hand, if the central bank exercises some control over the nominal
exchange rate, the domestic interest rate rises to match the foreign disturbance that
hits the economy, at least partially. Nominal rigidities further cause a signi¯cant
rise in the real interest rate, which, in turn, induces a contraction in output.
Productivity shock Figure 6 displays the impulse responses to a unit innovation
of a domestic productivity shock. Uncovered interest parity implies an initial nomi-
nal depreciation followed by expectations of a future appreciation, as re°ected in the
response of the nominal exchange rate. Similar to the previous cases, the nominal
exchange rate also exhibits the overshooting behavior, depreciating on impact, and
then staying persistently above the original steady state. The increase in domestic
productivity and the required real depreciation lead, for given domestic prices, to
an increase in CPI in°ation.
The same ¯gure displays the corresponding impulse responses under a managed
exchange rate. The responses of output gap and in°ation are qualitatively similar to
the °exible exchange rate case. However, the nominal interest rate fell just half way
without letting the currency to depreciate leads to an ampli¯cation of the responses
of the output gap and domestic in°ation.
Cost-push shock The cost-push shock has the most di®erent implications of the
other shocks considered in the dynamic model. In particular, a positive cost push
shock has an immediate impact in both domestic and CPI in°ation. The latter
increase several periods because the nominal exchange rate depreciates strongly on
impact and it is followed by expectations of further depreciation in the ¯rst periods.
In other words, the nominal exchange rate tends to undershoot its initial steady
state. Domestic prices tend to increase relatively more than the nominal exchange
rate. This combination together with the reaction of the interest rate has a negative
impact on the output gap.
In this case, under managed exchange rates, the cost-push shock is absorbed by
domestic prices and not by the nominal exchange rate. Therefore, the real exchange
rate appreciates considerably with a deeper negative impact on output.
A persistent monetary expansion, as in the original Dornbusch's paper, leads to
overshooting. We have modeled the monetary expansion as a transitory shock to
the in°ation target. Furthermore, under our calibration, the impact of both foreign
interest rate and technology shocks entails a parallel reaction of the exchange rate:
20overshooting. Meanwhile, under cost-push shocks the exchange rate depreciates on
impact and then rises again persistently above the steady state (undershooting), at
least in the ¯rst periods. In the augmented Taylor rule we cannot properly de¯ne
over- or under-shooting, but certainly the e®ects of shocks on the exchange rate are
attenuated by fear of °oating.
Unconditional Standard Deviations To evaluate the implications of alter-
native monetary rules, unconditional standard deviations are computed for each
shock.14 In particular, tables 1 and 2 compare the unconditional standard devia-
tions of the variables of the dynamic model considering a fully °exible exchange rate
and a managed regime, respectively. The main result is that °exible exchange rates
tend to dominate managed exchange rates if the economy is hit by a foreign interest
rate, productivity, or cost-push shock, while the reverse is true for an in°ation target
shock. This con¯rms the conventional wisdom that °exibility is better in the cases
of foreign and real shocks, while pegging is preferable in the case of nominal shocks.
For instance, if we take an in°ation target shock, we can see that output volatility
is lower in the °exible exchange rate case than in the managed case, because the
adjustment is immediately reached through changes in the exchange rate and not
through changes in the price level. CPI in°ation also di®ers across exchange rate
regimes. If the central bank can in°uence the exchange rate, in°ation volatility is
consistently lower than an economy with fully °exible exchange rates.
Table 1: Taylor rule: Unconditional Standard Deviations.
Variable In°ation Foreign Interest Productivity Cost Push
Target Rate
Output 2.13 1.40 0.23 2.74
Domestic In°ation 0.15 0.10 0.01 2.92
Interest Rate 0.09 0.36 0.09 1.22
CPI In°ation 0.40 1.10 0.23 2.00
Nom. Exchange Rate 1.60 2.49 0.62 19.77
Real Exchange Rate 0.24 0.61 0.17 3.84
Real Interest Rate 0.40 1.24 0.22 1.37
14All the shocks are independent and identically distributed shocks with zero mean and variance
¾
2
¼ = 0:25, ¾
2
i¤ = 0:25, ¾
2
z = 1, and ¾
2
¼ = 0:25:
21Table 2: Augmented Taylor rule (including the exchange rate): Unconditional Stan-
dard Deviations
Variable In°ation Foreign Interest Productivity Cost Push
Target Rate
Output 0.73 1.68 0.95 11.24
Domestic In°ation 0.04 0.07 0.04 1.96
Interest Rate 0.06 0.57 0.04 0.34
CPI In°ation 0.15 0.48 0.09 0.84
Nom. Exchange Rate 0.38 0.85 0.20 2.61
Real Exchange Rate 0.07 0.33 0.11 2.66
Real Interest Rate 0.15 0.88 0.08 0.63
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have outlined Dornbusch's overshooting model in a new Keyne-
sian dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy in which in°ation
targeting plays a key role for monetary policy. In this way we can verify whether
the main results still hold in a general equilibrium model with microeconomic foun-
dations, which is the main criticism against Dornbusch's original model. Indeed,
we ¯nd that persistent monetary expansions, as in the original overshooting model,
entail exchange rate overshooting.
Also, we argue that, most likely, exchange rates are subject to many shocks that
make di±cult the identi¯cation of the pure e®ect of permanent monetary shocks.
One potential explanation for the lack of empirical support for the original model
could be that undershooting dominates overshooting. However, in the basic theoret-
ical framework, the conditions to generate undershooting are rather arti¯cial (e.g.,
the interest rate rising as a result of a monetary expansion).
Although this model could generate some realistic correlations, the volatility
of exchange rates is still small with respect to the volatility of prices. This is a
traditional problem with calibrated general equilibrium models in their ability to
replicate asset price volatility. One possible way to reduce in°ation volatility with
respect to exchange rate volatility is to add more persistence in the in°ation process,
and some inertia in the Phillips curve. Alternatively, a more promising avenue would
be to consider incomplete pass-through from exchange rate to the price of tradables,
since in our simulations there is low volatility of non-tradable in°ation, and what
drives the volatility of in°ation is the impact of exchange rates on tradable in°ation.
Overall, however, these exercises show that although overshooting may be the result
of a monetary policy shock, exchange rate volatility must be dominated by other
disturbances.
22The model incorporates an exchange rate objective in the policy function, but
does not allow for sterilized intervention. In addition, there is a target for the
long run. This could be a reasonable working assumption to compare rules, but not
quite the best description of what policymakers do in reality. Fear of °oating is more
related to sudden and sharp changes in the exchange rate rather than targeting a
speci¯c level.
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25A Model Derivation
A.1 Aggregate Demand
For all di®erentiated goods, market clearing implies















































Plugging the previous equation into the aggregate domestic output de¯ned as
Yt ´
R 1














¾ (1 ¡ °)
qt (A.1)
where ' = [1 + ° (2 ¡ °)(¾´ ¡ 1)]and y¤
t = c¤
t:














Then, combining (A.1) and (A.2) we obtain an equation that relates domestic
consumption with domestic output and the real exchange rate









Finally, assuming that u(C) = C1¡¾
1¡¾ , and using the log-linearization version of
the Euler equation (18), we obtain the following expression:
26yt = Et[yt+1] ¡
1
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In terms of the output gap xt, we get the expression (27) in the main text
xt = Et[xt+1] ¡
1
¾








(Et[qt+1] ¡ qt) ¡ (1 ¡ ½z)zt:
or using the de¯nition of ¼t = ¼H;t +st ¡st¡1 and qt = (1 ¡ °) (st ¡ pH;t), we have
xt = Et[xt+1] ¡
1
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A.2 Aggregate Supply
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= 0:
In equilibrium, each consumer-producer that chooses a new price in period t will
choose the same new price, and the same level of output. Then the (aggregate) price
of domestic goods will obey












Log-linearizing around the steady state. We allow bounded °uctuations in
(CA
H;t+k, ¦H;t, Gt, ¤t, and Wt
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where » > 0 is the elasticity of V 0 with respect to Y d
t , 0 · ± · 1 is the share of





















































































































qt+k ¡ e zt+k
¸¾
+ ®¯Et [gt+1];




















where we let e zt = »zt and hence the output gap is de¯ned as xt = yd
t ¡ zt. Thus,
¼H;t = ¯Et [¼H;t+1] + ¸xxt + ¸qqt;
or recalling that qt = st + p¤
t ¡ pH;t, we get an expression for the aggregate supply
(equation (28) in the main text)










The dynamic system is given by equations (27), (28), (31), (34), and by the de¯nition
of nontradable in°ation, ¼NT
t = pNT
t ¡ pNT
t¡1. In matrix form, the system is the
following:
Et[kt+1] = Akt + Bvt; (A.3)






¢0, A is a
5 by 5 matrix of coe±cients, B is a 5 by 4 matrix of coe±cients, and vt is the vector
of shocks.
The dynamic system has two predetermined variables: it¡1 and pNT
t¡1 , and three
nonpredetermined variables: xNT
t , ¼NT
t , and st. Thus, as shown in Blanchard and
Kahn (1980), if the number of eigenvalues of A outside the unit circle is equal to
the number of nonpredetermined variables |in our case, three| then there exists
a unique rational expectations solution to system (A.3).
The strategy is to transform the model into canonical form. Let A = QJQ¡1,
where J is the Jordan matrix associated with A, and Q is the corresponding matrix
of eigenvectors. We de¯ne the vector of canonical variables as wt = Q¡1kt = (ut;zt)
0,






and Q = (Qu;Qz) be the corresponding partition of the Jordan
















The canonical system requires that we set ut = 0, 8t, to rule out explosive
solutions. If the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle is equal to the number





. We know that it¡1, pNT
t¡1 are predetermined, therefore zt+1 = Et[zt+1],
and this implies that zt = 'zzt¡1, where 'z is a 2 by 2 matrix with the two stable
eigenvalues in the diagonal. Therefore, this type of equilibrium implies that output,
in°ation, the real exchange rate and the interest rate converge towards their steady
states.
30Note: The solid line corresponds to a flexible exchange rate and the dashed line to a managed exchange rate.
Figure 4. Impulse Responses: Inflation Target Shock
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49Note: The solid line corresponds to a flexible exchange rate and the dashed line to a managed exchange rate.
Figure 5. Impulse Responses: Foreign Interest Rate Shock
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1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49Note: The solid line corresponds to a flexible exchange rate and the dashed line to a managed exchange rate.
Figure 6. Impulse Responses: Productivity Shock










1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49










1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49










1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49








1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49












1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49










1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49Note: The solid line corresponds to a flexible exchange rate and the dashed line to a managed exchange rate.
Figure 7. Impulse Responses: Cost Push Shock
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